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MULTIPLE CONTRACTUAL ASPECTS OF
COOPERATIVES' BY-LAWS
CHARLES E. NIEMAN*
I. RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN FARMERS AND COOPERATIVES
At least three kinds of litigation involving cooperatives recurrently have presented problems peculiar to such organizations. In
the past several years, numerous cases presented the question of
whether a cooperative association was subject to corporation in2
come tax on the net margins' which it distributed to its patrons..
Currently, a series of cases is developing involving the questions of
whether and when a patron of a cooperative must pay individual
income tax on the net margins which he receives in various forms
from his cooperative.: It may be anticipated that the future will
bring increased litigation between patrons and cooperatives with
4
respect to the computation and distribution of net margins.
*A.B. 1928, Beloit College; L.L.B. 1937, University of Wisconsin. Member of the Minnesota bar.
1. "Net margins," in this article, connotes a cooperative's receipts
(whether they be "income" to the cooperative or not) in excess of its costs,
expenses and limited dividends on capital.
2. E.g., Uniform Printing & Supply Co., 33 B. T. A. 1073 (1936), rev'd,
88 F. 2d 75 (7th Cir. 1937) ; Cooperative Oil Ass'n, Inc., 115 F. 2d 666 (9th
Cir. 1940) ; Peoples Gin Co., Inc., 41 B. T. A. 343 (1940), af'd, 118 F. 2d
72 (5th Cir. 1941) ; Midland Cooperative Wholesale, 44 B. T. A. 824 (1941) ;
Peoples Gin Co., Inc., 2 T. C. M. 325 (1943) ; San Joaquin Valley Poultry
Producers Ass'n, 136 F. 2d 382 (9th Cir. 1943); Greene County Farmers
Sales Ass'n v. United States, 55 F. Supp. 123 (1944) ; United Cooperatives,
Inc., 4 T. C. 93 (1944); American Box Shook Export Ass'n, 4 T. C. 758
(1945), aff'd, 156 F. 2d 629 (9th Cir. 1946) ; Fountain City Coop. Creamery
Ass'n, 9 T. C. 1077 (1947), aff'd, 172 F. 2d 666 (7th Cir. 1949) ; Associated
Grocers of Alabama v. Willingham, 77 F. Supp. 990 (N.D. Ala. 1948);
Farmers Cooperative Co. v. Birmingham, 86 F. Supp. 201 (N.D. Iowa 1949);
Colony Farms Coop. Dairy, Inc., 17 T. C. 688 (1951); Dr. P. Phillips Cooperative, 17 T. C. 1002 (1951).
3. For examples, see cases reviewed in parts VIII and IX, infra.
4. For example, in Viker v. Halstad Elevator Co., Inc., not reported,
(14th Dist. Minn. 1951), Mischler, Summary of Cooperative Cases 50, p. 24
(U. S. Dept. Agr., Coop. R. & S. Div., June, 1951) plaintiff-patron claimed
a patronage refund computed by dividing net margins for year by bushels
handled in year and multiplying that fraction by bushels delivered by plaintiffpatron, but defendant-association first made an extra payment to flax patrons
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The cooperatives' income tax cases constituted a long course of
administrative and judicial wallowing among various theories5
of first four months to distribute to them a large inventory gain realized on
flax received in that period. Farmers who experienced market conditions
before they had cooperatives realize that the existence of their cooperative
and its effect on prices and practices are more important to them than patronage refunds. Consequently, they do not argue about their. refunds. Younger
farmers without that experience are more inclined to take the existence of
their cooperative for granted and -:o place more importance on their patronage
refunds. This change in attitude, increased volume and more exact accounting
combine to produce more patron-cooperative litigation. Hence, it is important for lawyers and judges to learn about cooperative history, theory
and practice.
5. "Let us first, for the moment, and with appropriate sympathy for
them, consider the mental tortures which the Judges underwent when they
first sought to analyze the cooperative corporation. At first blush, no particular problem was apparent. It was assumed that cooperatives were corporations
just as any other incorporated business unit was a corporation. Ergo,by applying the law applicable to ordinary corporations, there should be no particular
problem. But it was not long before the fallacy of this proposition beganand I say advisedly-to become apparent, although the fallacy is still deeprooted and widespread among uninformed business men and lawyers....
"The more closely the cooperative corporations were scrutinized through
the judicial microscope, an unbelievable and almost horrifying fact began
to dawn upon the judges. These cooperatives were neither fish, fowl, nor
flesh-yet, they possessed some of the attributes of all three....
" . . [Iln applying the law of general corporations to cooperative corporations, the judiciary did not -are badly until they were confronted with
the lethal 'patronage refund.' This was a new one. There was nothing in the
books on the subject; yet, since tae cooperative was a corporation, there just
had to be some bolt in the corporate anatomy-since it is an inanimate entity
-upon which this nut was to be screwed. As a flash from the blue finally
came the answer to a perspiring nd exhausted judiciary-why, it is merely a
corporate dividend. Why, in the name of Heaven didn't we recognize this
sooner? This opiate was shortlived.
"Corporate dividends were predicted upon investment by stockholders.
These so-called 'patronage dividends' had no apparent relation to investment,
but were anchored to something ntirely new-volume of business done with
the corporation-in other words, patronage. Then followed the second
anguished effort to classify this elusive 'patronage refund' in normal and
accepted corporate terminology. Again came the flash from the blue-these
things are nothing more nor less than 'trade discounts.' Why didn't we
think of that sooner?
"But the bliss did not last long, and the second opiate again wore off.
Trade discounts as to the purchasing cooperatives were fine. The corporation
had taken more from the patron than that which it had sold him was worth.
But, what about the progressive payments to farmers for products which
he sells through the association? And, here, again, the fog closed in. ...
"Of only one thing may we be sure out of all the welter of the present
confusion on this subject, namely, that the status of patronage refunds is
governed by the law of contract and contract alone, except as positive statute
law may control a cooperative business unit. As in the case of all contract:,
the legal relationships created thereby depend upon the terms and provisions
of each contract. Hence, abstract generalization on the subject is very
difficult if not impossible, and this may be-and probably is-the chief
reason for the present state of confusion.
"In earlier years, the Bureau of Internal Revenue was inclined to permit
or allow exclusions or deductions, from gross income of non-exempt cooperatives, of patronage refunds actually paid before the close of the fiscal
year. This rule was observed even though the cooperative was under no
mandatory obligation to make such payments, and the payment or non-
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before the mandatory obligation and reinvestment theory was firmly
established." Proper application of the same principles to the
patrons' cases would produce sound and consistent results. However, the Tax Court too summarily dismissed the application of
those principles to a patron's tax case.7 As a consequence of failure
to examine underlying principles, farmers and their lawyers are
now confronted with at least three conflicting views concerning the
taxability to patrons of net margins allocated to them by their
cooperatives." In order to determine satisfactorily disputes bepayment of patronage refunds rested in the discretion of the board of
directors.
"So far as ascertainable, no express negation of the earlier rules in this
respect can be found. But, by implication, if not expressly, the Courts have
discarded the proposition....

"The rule today appears to be pretty firmly established that in order
for a cooperative to exclude patronage refunds from gross income, the

exclusion must be pursuant to a legal obligation to make the refund growing
out of a pre-existing, enforceable contract creating the obligation. Such a
mandatory obligation makes any income that of the patrons on a partnership
basis rather than that of the cooperative corporation.
"Attention should be directed to the fact that a sharp distinction must
be made between the terms deduction and exclusion. Legal deductions are
permitted only pursuant to legislative grace granting the privilege. Exclusions of patronage refunds, under proper contractual obligations, are a matter
of Constitutional right, under the Sixteenth Amendment." Hensel, Taxation
of Cooperathives,Cooperative Law-1950 81-85 (Am. Inst Coop., Wash., D. C.,
1950).
6. United Cooperatives, Inc., 4 T. C. 93, 108 (1944): "The result of
the procedure set up in petitioner's by-laws was as if the stockholder member
who was under obligation to purchase additional stock had received, in cash,
the 'patronage dividend' and had thereupon applied this sum to payment of
stock. The stock, when thus paid and issued to him ... represented an additional investment on his part to the capital of the corporation out of his
savings from the annual transactions with petitioner."
7. B. A. Carpenter, 20 T. C. 603, 607 (1953) : "We do not think that it
necessarily follows that what is excludable from the income of the cooperative
...automatically becomes income to the member." With no consideration of
"why" or "why not," that statement explained nothing and produced only
confusion. If net margins are excludable by a cooperative, it is only because
the money in question is income to the patron rather than to the cooperative.
8. Kerner, Taxability of Cooperative Retains, 7 Cooperative Accountant
No. 3, 11 (Fall, 1954).
"We are now faced with three views:
"The position of the Internal Revenue Service is that all retained noncash allocations made to a patron of a farmer cooperative must be taken into
account in computing gross income of such patron in the year in which the
patron is notified of the apportionment of such item.
"The Tax Court (Howey v. Commissioner, T. C. Memo 1954 No. 19,
and cases cited) has in a number of cases held such allocations to be taxable
at their fair market value.
"The U. S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has now said (Caswell v. Commissioner, 211 F. 2d 693) that such allocations are not taxable
at the time evidence thereof is issued to the cooperative patron.
"Needless to say, cooperative patrons and their advisers find no area
of certainty in this tax field. The answer to the important question of time
of taxability will inevitably be given, but, as in the case of the question itself,
no one can say when."
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tween cooperatives and their patrons, the courts will have to realize
the nature of that relationship. It is a contractual relationship. Frequently, the controlling terms of the contract are found in the cooperative's articles of incorporation, or by-laws, or both.0 But there
is too little realization that cooperatives' by-laws frequently include
more than one kind of a contract' 0 and give rise to more than one
kind of legal relationship to the cooperative." It is this writer's
purpose to consider the nature of those contracts and relationships.
Different farmers stand in different legal relationships to the
same cooperative; and any one farmer frequently stands in more
than one legal
relationship to the cooperative. One farmer may be a
"member,"' 2 but not a "patron," of a given cooperative. A second
farmer may be a "patron," 3 but not a "member," of the same cooperative. A third farmer may be both a "member" and a "patron"
of that cooperative. In such a situation, the first and third farmers,
as "members," have certain rights-such as the right to vote; but
the second farmer, as a non-member "patron," has none of those
rights. The second and third farmers, as "patrons," have certain
rights-such as the right to a share of the net margins; but the
first farmer, as a non-patron "member," has no such rights. The
third farmer, being both a "member" and a "patron," possesses
both kinds of rights; but he is entitled to some of them only in his
capacity as a "member" and to others only in his capacity as a
"patron." Clearly, "member" and "patron" are not synonyms.
Confusion triumphs when people refer to that third farmer as a
"member" in discussing his rights and obligations as a "patron,"
or when they refer to him as a "patron" in discussing the rights and
responsibilities which accrue to him only in his capacity as a
"member." Consequently, it is important to realize that a farmer
may stand in more than one legal relationship to a cooperative.
Realizing that, it is important to refer to him in terms of the par9. For convenience, reference herein to "by-laws" is on the under-

standing that some of the considered provisions may be found in either the
statute, the articles of incorporation, the by-laws, separate documents, or
any combination of those sources.
10. For convenience, reference will be made to the "membership contract," the "patronage contract," and the "investment contract."
11. E.g., the cooperative-member relationship under the "membership
contract," the cooperative-patron relationship under the "patronage contract,"
and the cooperative-investor relationship under the "investment contract."
12. "Members," unless otherwise indicated connotes both "members" of

non-stock assocations and voting "shareholders" of stock associations.

13. A farmer becomes a "patron" of a cooperative by "patronizing" it,
i.e., by delivering commodities to be cooperatively marketed by it, or by
receiving goods or services cooperatively furnished by it.
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ticular relationship or capacity which gives rise to the particular
rights and obligations under consideration. 14
Confusion probably results, in part, from the fact that most
cooperatives' by-laws1- include provisions which constitute contracts and thereby create legal relationships which, in other kinds
of corporations, usually arise out of other documents which are
separate from the by-laws. As in other corporations, the applicable
statutes, articles of incorporation, and by-laws of a cooperative
constitute what may be termed a "membership contract" between
the corporation and its members or shareholders for the government of the corporation.,, Unlike other corporations, however, a
cooperative's by-laws frequently include also a "patronage contract" between the cooperative and its patrons, and many times also
include an "investment contract" between the cooperative and
investors.
II. THE "MEMBERSHIP

CONTRACT"

The "membership contract" set forth in a cooperative's incorporation papers ordinarily does not differ greatly from those of
other corporations with respect to form, subjects, and parties. In
both kinds of corporations, that contract is between the corporation
and its members or shareholders as such. 7 In both, provision ordinarily is made for the corporate name, purposes, place of business,
capital stock or membership capital, board of directors, officers,
stockholders' meetings, etc. The respective rights and responsibilities of the corporation and its members or shareholders must be
14. Too many accountants, lawyers and judges too often speak of
"members" or "stockholders" when discussing the patrons' rights to a patronage payment, and too often refer to patronage margins as "earnings" and to
patronage payments as "dividends." Is it any wonder, then, that laymen fail
to discern the distinction between (1) patronage margins which a cooperative
owes to its patrons as creditors and (2) earnings or profits which a corporation (either a cooperative or for profit) owns and may either retain for itself
or pay over to its stockholders as owners? If lawyers drafting by-laws for
cooperatives say "retain" instead of "pay" in connection with patronage
margins and "pay" instead of "repurchase" or "retire" in connection with
the repurchase or retirement of shares of stock or revolving fund credits,
is it any wonder that judges as well as laymen gain the misimpression that
the by-laws do not obligate the cooperative to pay the patronage margins to
its patrons unless and until the cooperative repurchases or retires the shares
of stock or revolving fund credits in which the stockholder or credit holder
invested the proceeds of his patronage payment which was paid to him, as a
patron, several years earlier?
15. See note 9 supra.
16. They also operate as a contract between the state and the corporation and a contract between the shareholders inter sese. Somerville v. St. Louis
M. & M. Co., 46 Mont. 268, 127 Pac. 464 (1912).

17. Cf.ibid.
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spelled out from those "membership contract" provisions of the
statute, articles, and by-laws.
In almost all corporations for profit and some cooperatives,
those "membership contract" provisions constitute the entire bylaws. Subject to the rights of the state, the corporation and its
shareholders or members are the only parties affected by them.
While the corporation is bound by its articles and by-laws and its
creditors were charged at common law and under some corporation
statutes with notice of limitations of the corporation's powers, '1
the by-laws of most corporations do not spell out the terms under
which they will do business with their customers. Their contracts
with their customers, if written, are separate from their by-laws.
Nor do the by-laws of most corporations spell out the terms of
their bond issues and other investment securities other than capital
stock or membership capital. The by-laws of corporations for profit
almost invariably are neither a "patronage contract" between the
corporation and its customers or patrons nor an "investment contract" between the corporation and investors in its securities other
than capital stock or membership capital.
III.

THE "PATRONAGE

CONTRACT"

The by-laws of early cooperatives were similar to those of other
corporations in that they constituted only a "membership contract"
between the cooperative and its stockholders or members. However,
the very nature of cooperatives and their purpose to do business at
cost19 for the mutual benefit of their patrons necessarily introduced
into their transactions with their patrons a contractual element
18. 13 A. J. Corporation § 745. Modern corporation statutes relax the
common law rule of constructive'notice. E.g., Minn. Stat. § 301.11 (1953).
By-laws as such generally bind only the members and officers and persons
having or required to take notice of them. 13 A. J. Corporations § 161.
19. If an organization does not distribute net margins to patrons in
proportion to patronage, it is not a cooperative. Nieman, Imitation Cooperatives, American Cooperation 1942-1945 86 (Am. Inst. Coop., Phila., 1945).
"The primary object of a cooperative ... is not returns on invested capital
but service at cost." Fetrow, Three Principles of Agricultural Cooperation
(F.C.A., U. S. Dept. Agr. Cir. E24, 1940). "An agricultural cooperative
association . . . operates for the mutual benefit of its members or stock-

holders, as producers or patrons on a cost basis after allowing for the
expenses of operation and maintenance and any other authorized deduction
for expansion and necessary reserves." Hulbert, Legal Phases of Cooperative
Associations 1 (F.C.A. U. S. Dept. Agr. Bull. 50, 1942). That the cooperative "must be organized in such manner as to legally bind it to operate on
a cost or non-profit basis for the benefit of its patrons" has been described as
one of "the federal statutory tests of a true cooperative." Jensen, The Bill of
Rights of U. S. Cooperative Agriculture, 20 Rocky Mt. L. Rev. 193, 194
(1948).
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which ordinarily is not involved in profit corporations' transactions
with their customers. That new element is the necessity for adjusting to "cost" at the close of the fiscal year or some other period,
the cooperative's payments to its patrons for their products and
the patrons' payments to the cooperative for supplies or services
furnished by it.
In rudimentary cooperative marketing transactions, the cooperative paid nothing to its patrons until after it had sold their products,
collected the proceeds of such sales, and deducted its own costs and
expenses. In those early, informal, cooperative transactions, there
usually was no express, written "patronage contract" either in the
by-laws or in any other document. Such a contract nevertheless
existed. The parties understood and agreed, impliedly if not expressly, that the cooperative would pay over to the patrons in proportion to their patronage all marketing proceeds in excess of the
cooperative's costs and expenses and sometimes a limited dividend
on capital.
A variety of developments led to writing out those "patronage
contracts." Those early written "patronage contracts" were separate and distinct from the by-laws. They generally were termed,
"Marketing Agreements.""- The mechanical difficulties and expense of periodically "signing up" all patrons, mostly the same
ones, all over again and of keeping track of many separate, almost
identical, documents, problems of enforcement of marketing contracts, the decline of the concept of "tying up" patrons' production
so as to enable the cooperative to influence prices, 2' and the rise
of the concept of maintaining an adequate volume of patronage
by furnishing satisfactory services and prices led to the decline of
separate "Marketing Contracts" and to the substitution of additional, new provisions in the by-laws-the insertion of the "patronage contract" in the by-laws.
Those provisions should set forth the cooperative's obligation
to pay and the patrons' right to receive the net margins as well as
provisions for the computation of the net margins. Such provisions
spell out the terms on which the cooperative transacts business with
its patrons and define the rights and obligations of the cooperative
20. "Marketing Agreements" are expressly authorized by Minn. Stat.
§ 22.18 (1953). In other parts of the country, they are still widely used,
but generally as a supplement to by-laws. For example, see Hulbert, op. cit.
supra note 19, at 388; 8 Am. Jur., Legal Forms 650 et seq.
21. Fetrow and Elsworth, Agricultural Cooperation in the U. S. 2-3

(F.C.A., U. S. Dept. Agr. Bull. 54, 1947); McKay, Beginning With Ben
Franklin, Marketing-The Yearbook of Agriculture 1954 248 (Supt. of

Documents, Wash., D. C., 1954).
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and its patrons as such.2 2 Those by-law provisions which we refer
to as the "patronage contract," deal with subject matter related to
patronage, and they apply to parties who are patrons. They are in
addition to and different from the by-law provisions which we have
referred to as the "membership contract." By-laws which include
such patronage provisions are peculiar to cooperatives. Confusion
and wrong results will be avoided if it is realized that such by-laws
include two different contracts-a "patronage contract" between
the cooperative and its patrons in addition to the more familiar
"membership contract" between a corporation and its members or
2

shareholders.3

To the extent that such "patronage contract" provisions obligate the cooperative to pay all or part of the net margins to its
patrons, a patron can compel the cooperative to account to him and
to pay him the amount owing to him.2 4 Similarly, to the extent
above indicated, the net margins are excludable from the cooperative's gross income for corporation income tax purposes.2 Such
net margins paid by marketing cooperatives are includable in the
22. Most cooperatives accept patronage of both member-patrons and
nonmember-patrons; and most of them distribute net margins to both kinds
of patrons on the basis of their patronage. Thus it is "patronage," not "membership," which entitles one to the net margins; and that right is an
incident of the "patron" relationship, not the "member" relationship, to the
cooperative. Even in cooperatives which distribute net margins only to
member-patrons to the exclusion of nonmember-patrons, only those members
who patronize the cooperative and thereby gain the added status of "patron"
are entitled to the net margins. Members who do not patronize the association and, therefore, do not become "patrons," as well as "members," are not
entitled to share the net margins. Thus, even in such associations, the right
to share the net margins is incidental to the "patron" relationship, not the
"member" relationship.
23. In Grey Bull Corp., 27 B. T. A. 853, 858 (1933), the "patronage
contract" was a separate document from the by-laws. The court properly
recognized that "[tihe individuals were both shareholders in the petitioner
as a corporation and contractors with it as an agent, bailee or agister."
Where both kinds of a contrac-: are combined in a single document, the
difference between the two contracts and the difference between the individual's two relationships to the corporation should not be overlooked. "Contract" is not synonymous with either "document" or "instrument" or "writing."
A contract is a legally enforceable "agreement"V-not a piece of paper. It may
be either oral, or written, or partly oral and partly written. If it is in
writing, the written evidence of the agreement may consist of either a single
writing or of several. Any one document may include either parts or all of
either one or several contractual agreements. Thus corporate by-laws may
set forth either parts or all of either one or several contracts.
24. Rhodes v. Little Falls Dairy Company, Inc., 230 App. Div. 571,
245 N. Y. Supp. 432 (1930), aff'd, 256 N. Y. 559, 117 N. E. 140 (1931).
Compare Hulbert, op. cit. mtpra. note 19, at 69.
25. Home Builders Shipping Ass'n, 8 B. T. A. 903 (1927); Farmers
Union Cooperative Ass'n, 13 B. T. A. 969 (1928) ; Anamosa Farmers Creamery Co., 13 B. T. A. 907 (1928) ; Uniform Printing and Supply Co., 88 F. 2d
75 (7th Cir. 1937) ; Peoples Gin Co., Inc., 2 T. C. 325 (1943). Compare
Peoples Gin Co., 41 B. T. A. 343 ,1940), aff'd, 118 F. 2d 72 (5th Cir. 1941).
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patron's gross income. 28 In spite of much misdescriptive language, 27
there has been relatively little difficulty in applying those principles in cases where the cooperative paid the net margins in cash
and there was no reinvestment of that cash in the cooperative.
IV.

PAYMENT OF NET MARGINS "IN" STOCK-DISCHARGE OF
"PATRONAGE CONTRACT" AND INCEPTION OF
"MEMBERSHIP CONTRACT"

Where, however, the "patronage contract" obligated the cooperative to pay the net margins to its patrons and each patron was
obligated to invest a like amount of money in the cooperative's capital stock, the cooperative customarily set off its obligation to each
patron against that patron's obligation to the cooperative and issued
stock to the patron. By issuance of the stock, (1) both parties' obligations under their "patronage contract" were fully performed and
thereby discharged, and (2) that "patronage contract" itself was
fully executed and thereby discharged, and (3) a new executory
contract, the "membership contract," was thereby entered into by
the same parties. In terms of legal relationships, the farmer thereby
ceased to be a "patron" under one contract and became a "share28
holder" under a new and different contract.
The fact that, under the "membership contract" provisions of
the corporate articles and by-laws, it is discretionary with the cooperative's Board of Directors as to whether or when the cooperative will repurchase or retire the shareholder'sshares of stock does
not establish that, under the "patronage contract," it was discretionary with the cooperative's Board of Directors as to whether or
when the cooperative would pay the patron's net margins. On the
contrary, the cooperative becomes obligated, at the time of the
patronage transaction, by the terms of the "patronage contract."
That obligation exists before the "membership contract" is subsequently entered into by the issuance of the stock.
That practice of setting off the cooperative's obligation against
the patron's obligation and issuing shares of stock has been popularly referred to, "in a shorthand manner of speaking, ' 2 as paying
26. See discussion and cases cited in parts VII and VIII infra.
27. Repeated references to patrons as "members" even in cases where
nonmember-patrons also are equally entitled to the net margins.
28. See note 23 supra.
29. "In a shorthand manner of speaking, the cooperative has paid out
the net margins by issuing stock. But no one can communicate anything by
speaking or writing shorthand unless the person he is addressing under-
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the net margins "in" stock. The use of that oversimplified expression obscures the actual transactions and legal theory underlying
that practice. It permits the misimpression that a cooperative does
not pay the net margins to its patrons as required by the "patronage contract" unless and until it repurchases or retires the shares of
the stock by payment to its shareholdersas permitted by the "membership contract." 80
It is now well settled that if a cooperative under the provisions
of its "patronage contract" with its patrons is obligated to pay the
net margins to its patrons, then the cooperative receives that income
without any claim of right to it but only as an agent or conduit for
the payment of it to the patrons and, under such circumstances,
the cooperative may exclude the patrons' net margins from its
gross income when computing its income tax. That is true without
reference to whether such payment is in cash or pursuant to the
patrons' authorization "in" stock and regardless of the market
value of the stock-properly so, because the agreement of the
parties and the factual substaruce and legal effect of their transaction
is that the cooperative has paid the full amount of the net margins
to the patrons in cash. That remains true even though the patron
reinvested that cash in the capital stock of the cooperative. The
patron having thus received a certain amount of cash, he should
include that amount as gross income in his individual income tax
return.
stands shorthand. A great number of patrons and their lawyers, revenue
agents and conferees, judges and jurymen do not understand shorthand very
well. Consequently, it is a prudent precaution for the by-law draftsman to use
English rather than shorthand and to spell out carefully (1) the cooperative's
obligation to distribute all or a specified or ascertainable amount of the net
margins in cash at a certain time, and (2) the patron's obligation to pay an
equal amount of cash for a specified or ascertainable amount of stock
at the same time, and (3) the cooperative's authority, upon issuing its stock
to the patron, to set off against its indebtedness to the patron his indebtedness to the cooperative." Nieman, By-Law Provisions for Patronage Distributions, Cooperative Law-190, 625 (Am. Inst. of Coop., Wash., D. C.,
1950).
30. With that misimpression as its false major premise, the Treasury
added the true minor premise that it is discretionary with the cooperative
whether and when it will "pay" its stock to its shareholders. The Treasury
thereby produced the false conclusion that it is discretionary with the cooperative whether and when it will pay the net margins to its patrons. That
unsound syllogism was the basis for the Treasury's contention in the early
1940's that if a cooperative's by-laws permitted it to pay the net margins
"in" stock which the cooperative was not obligated to "pay" in cash, the
cooperative was not obligated to pay the net margins to its patrons. Therefore, so the Treasury argued, the cooperative was not entitled to exclude the
net margins from its gross income when computing its -income tax liability.
The fallacy of that argument was exposed in United Cooperatives, Inc.,
4 T. C. 93 (1944). See note 6 suf.ra.
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V. THE "INVESTMENT CONTRACT"
In a non-stock membership corporation which requires no initiation or membership fee as a condition to membership and which
must, on dissolution, pay the net assets to someone other than the
members, there is no capital stock or membership capital. In such
a corporation, the by-laws 31 constitute a "membership contract,"
but no investment is involved. On the other hand, the by-laws of a
stock corporation and those of a membership corporation which
requires an initiation or membership fee which becomes membership capital involve an investment as a part of the "membership
contract."
Relatively few corporations, however, are financed only by
capital stock or membership fees. Most corporations supplement
that capital by borrowing from stockholders, banks, or the public.
For stockholder or bank loans, the corporation issues its notes.
For a public loan, it issues bonds. In either event, the terms of
those loans are not ordinarily included in the by-laws.
Early cooperatives were financed like other corporations, principally by issuing stock and by borrowing from their members and
banks. However, the peculiar corporate purposes of a cooperative
-to provide services at cost for, and thereby to increase the income
of, its patrons--developed the need for a new and different kind of
capital. 32 The problems incident to shares having a fixed par or
stated value and to shares or memberships constituting permanent
capital were met by the creation of a new kind of temporary or
31. See note 9 supra.
32. "There is a growing realization that the capital of a cooperative, so
far as the permanency or impermanency of the shares or other units of the
capital is concerned, is essentially different from the capital of other business corporations.

Corporate capital ordinarily

represents a permanent

investment for the purpose of producing a recurring income to the investor.
The shareholder does not expect that the capital which he contributed will be
returned to him until dissolution. He understands that, prior to dissolution,
he can recover the amount of his contribution, more or less, only by selling
and transferring his shares to a purchaser which sometimes may be, but
ordinarily is not, the corporation. A cooperative's capital, however, more often

represents essentially a loan or temporary contribution by its patrons to
finance certain economic services for them. The patron-member or patronshareholder expects that the capital which he contributes will be returned
to him prior to dissolution, but not until his own and other patrons' subsequent contributions to capital render his earlier contribution unnecessary
to finance the cooperative's facilities and operations. He does not expect
to wait until dissolution, and he knows that his shares are not readily salable.
He looks to the cooperative to return his capital contributions to him if, and
as soon as, it can do so." Nieman, Revolving Capital in Stock Cooperative

Corporations,13 Law & Contemp. Prob. 393-394 (1948).
See Nieman, Capital Securities of Agricultural CooperativeAssociations,
American Cooperation-1947 235 (Am. Inst. Coop., Wash., D. C., 1948).
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interim capital which is now quite common,8 although peculiar to
cooperatives-that is, revolvirg fund capital.
Revolving capital developed over a period of time from various
experiments and innovations. Some early attempts to establish revolving capital involved no express written contract-either in the
by-laws or in any other document3 4 Again, one should not overlook
the fact that such actions, nevertheless, were based on an oral or
implied contract.3
In time, those unwritten understandings relative to revolving
capital were written out by adding to the by-laws provisions for a
revolving fund.386 Thus many cooperatives introduced into their
by-laws a third kind of a contract, an "investment contract," which
33. The legality of the revolving plan of financing cooperatives has
been judicially recognized. See, Hulbert, op. cit. supra note 19, at 278 and
cases cited. For discussions of revolving capital generally, see Evans &
Stokdyk, The Law of Agricultural Co-operative Marketing 173 (1937);
Hulbert, op. cit. supranote 19, at 276 et seq.; Sanders, Organizing a Farmers'
Cooperative (F.C.A., U. S. Dept. Agr., Cir. C-108, 1939); Hedges, Organization Structure of Farmers' Elevators 15 (F.C.A., U. S. Dept. Agr., Cir.
C-115, June, 1939) ; Jensen, Revoluing Capital from Patronage Refunds.
Cooperative Law-1950, 586 (Am. Inst. Coop., Wash., D. C., 1950) ; Miller
and Jensen, Failure of Farmers' Cooperatives, Harv. Bus. Rev. 213, 220
(Winter 1947).
34. Hundreds of Minnesota cooperatives established a "Patrons Equity
Reserve" simply by transferring net margins to a new account designated,
"Patrons Equity Reserve," without either any separate written contract, bylaw amendment, or even any record in the minute book. Yet none of those
transactions nor any of the thousands of subsequent additions to or payments
from those "Patrons Equity Reserves" has produced any litigation. The
authority for the establishment and operation of those "Patrons Equity
Reserves" must be found in the common understanding (implied contract) of
the cooperatives and their patrons as evidenced by the widespread and uniform acceptance of such an arrangement
35. "Those securities, by whatever name they were called, were
intended to show that the co-op had received money which-like capital
and unlike indebtedness-could be retained by the co-op for so long as it
needed the money; but which-like indebtedness and unlike capital-must be
repaid sometime prior to dissolution. Those securities later were expressly
authorized by statute in some states, but the legislators wisely refrained
from attempting to define or spell out exactly what they were authorizing."
Nieman, Capital Securities of Agricultural Cooperative Associations, American Cooperation-1947, 235, 242 (Am. Inst Coop., Wash., D. C., 1948).
36. In Reinert v. California Almond Growers Exchange, 63 P. 2d 1114,
1119 (1936), the accumulation of certain reserves and the revolving of them
prior to 1928 had grown up as an equitable practice without any authorization
or requirement of any by-law or"any other written contract. However, in
1928, the by-laws were amended to provide the revolving capital plan for the
future. See Jensen, Revolving Capital from PatronageRefunds, Cooperative
Law-1950, 586, 590 (Am. Inst. Coop., Wash., D. C., 1950). Numerous
Mlinnesota cooperatives similarly started "Patrons Equity Reserves" or other
revolving capital plans and then subsequently reduced that previously implied contract to writing by adopting a by-law. In 1953, the Minnesota Legislature approved the wide use of revolving capital by expressly authorizing
cooperatives to pay out the net margins "in cash, credits, revolving fund
certificates, or its own or other securities." Laws 1953, c. 16, § 2. (Emphasis

supplied.)
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ordinarily is not found in the by-laws of other kinds of corporations.
Thus a third kind of a relationship arises out of many coopera37
tives' by-laws-corporation and investor.
To the three farmers who are, respectively, (a) only a shareholder or member, (b) only a patron, and (c) both a member and
a patron, by-laws providing for a revolving fund add parties who
may be (d) only an investor, (e) both an investor and a member,
(f) both an investor and a patron, or (g) all three-a member and
a patron and an investor. Where revolving fund credits are originally issued for cash or property invested by one who is neither a
member nor a patron, 38 or where a revolving fund credit was issued
as a result of a patron's reinvestment of his share of the net margins
but subsequently assigned by him to an assignee" who is neither a
member nor a patron, the holder of the credit is by hypothesis
neither a member nor a patron. Not being a member, he cannot
37. Under some by-laws provisions, the cooperative may be so obligated
(1) to discharge the revolving fund credits at some definite or ascertainable
maturity date, and (2) to pay in the meantime interest on the principal
amount of such credits, that they constitute "indebtedness" and the holder of
such credits is properly a "creditor." Other by-law provisions are so lacking in those indicia of indebtedness that the revolving fund credits do not
properly constitute indebtedness and the holders are not creditors; on the
contrary, the credits are equity or ownership capital. (See I. T. 3208, 1938-2
Cum. Bull. 127), but they definitely are not stock or memberships as such.
Under both kinds of by-laws, the revolving fund may be designated by any of a
wide variety of terms, such as "patrons equity reserve," "capital reserve,"
"deferred patronage refunds," "patrons' equities," "allocated surplus," "capital credits," etc.; and the certificates issued to evidence an interest in the fund
may bear any one of an even more bewildering assortment of titles, such as
"revolving fund certificate," certificate of indebtedness," "certificate of interest," "certificate of ownership," "retain certificate," etc.; and frequently, no
formal certificate is issued at all. Consequently, "investment contract" is
used in this article to indicate the contractual agreement which gives rise
to any of those varied interests, and "investor" is used to designate the holder
of such an interest.
38. The by-laws of many Minnesota cooperatives include the following,
or similar, provision: "This association may accept contributions to its revolving fund from any persons approved by the Board of Directors." While
most revolving fund credits result from patrons' reinvestment of their net
margins, that is neither necessarily nor in practice the only source of revolving capital. All or part of the initial capital of several cooperatives has
been acquired by contributions of cash or property for which revolving fund
credits were issued before the cooperative commenced operating and, therefore, before it had any patrons. Other cooperatives have purchased and wholly
or partially paid for facilities and equipment by issuing revolving fund credits
to the seller who generally was neither a member nor a patron.
39. Although board approval of the assignee is sometimes required, revolving fund credits usually are transferable. The plaintiff in the Reinert
case, supra note 36, was the assignee of the original holder of the revolving
book credits on which her suit for an accounting was based. Where the
initial holder dies and his credits are thereby assigned to his personal representative or heirs, the assignee acquires all of the decedent's rights in the
revolving capital. But it is a relatively unusual coincidence if the assignee is
either a member or a patron.
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vote. Not being a patron, he has no right to the net margins. But
he does have certain rights as the holder of a revolving fund credit,
viz., (1) to receive cash for the retirement of his credit in the
course of revolving the fund, (2) to participate in the distribution
of the net assets, in order of priority, on dissolution if his credit
has not previously been retired, and (3) in many cases, an absolute or conditional right to interest on it so long as his credit remains outstanding. Neither a member nor a patron has any of
those rights with respect to the revolving fund. Quite plainly, the
relationship between the cooperative and the investors in its revolving fund is distinct and different from either its relationship with
its members or its relationship with its patrons. Moreover, the
cooperative-investor relationship is based upon and arises out of
different transactions and contractual provisions than either the
cooperative-member relationship or the cooperative-patron relationship. It is most important to realize that where the same individual is either (1) both a member and investor, or (2) both a
patron and an investor, or (3) a member and a patron and an
investor, his rights and obligations in each capacity arise out of a
different transaction and a different contract and involve a different
relationship than his rights and obligations in either of his other
capacities.
VI. ' PAYMENT OF NET MARGINS "IN" REVOLVING FuND CREDITS
-DIsCHARGE OF "PATRONAGE CONTRACT" AND INCEPTION OF
"INvESTMI ENT CONTRACT"
Just as some cooperatives pay the net margins "in" stock, 40 so
other cooperatives sometimes pay the net margins "in" revolving

fund credits. 41 The substance and legal effect of the transactions
are the same in both cases. Where a cooperative is obligated by its
"patronage contract" to pay t:he net margins to patrons who are
obligated to invest a like amount42 of money in the revolving fund,
40. See part IV mipra.
41. Still other cooperatives pay the net margins "in" various kinds of
non-stock investments other than revolving fund credits. See note 37 supra.
Regardless of which kind of credit or investment interest is issued, the
applicable legal principles are the same. Hence, references to "revolving fund
credits" do not imply that any different principles would apply if the cooperative issued capital credits, credits in an allocated reserve or surplus,
retain credits, or any other kind of an investment interest.
42. Some by-laws obligate each patron to invest an amount equal to a
percentage of his share of the net margins. If a patron is obligated to invest
75%, the cooperative will issue revolving fund credits for 75% and its check
for 25%. Such a transaction is popularly summarized by saying that the cooperative "paid the net margins 75% 'in' credits and 25% 'in' cash." Actually,
the cooperative pays 100% of the net margin in cash and the patron reinvests
75% as much cash in the revolving fund. See note 29 supra.
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the cooperative sets off each patron's obligation against its own obligation and issues a revolving fund credit to the patron. When that
is done, (1) each party's obligation under their "patronage contract" is fully performed and thereby discharged, and (2) the
"patronage contract" itself becomes fully executed and thereby
discharged, and (3) an entirely new, executory "investment contract" is then entered into by the same parties. 43 The relationship
of cooperative-patron-based upon the patronage from which the
net margins were accumulated-is terminated, and the new relationship of cooperative-investor is created.
In the cooperatives' tax cases, it is now clear that a cooperative's right to exclude from its gross income the net margins which
it pays to its patrons in performance of a pre-existing obligation is
unaffected by the fact that the patrons reinvested their proceeds
44
of such payment in a revolving fund instead of in capital stock.
That sound result was obscured for a few years by dictum of the
Tax Court in Fountain City Cooperative Creamery Association v.
Commissioner.4 5 However, in the Colony Farms case, the Tax
Court pointed out that the basis for its decision in Fountain City
was the absence of any obligation to pay the patrons rather than
any differences between preferred stock and revolving fund
43. When one indebted on an open account delivers and his creditor

accepts the debtor's promissory note in payment of the open account indebtedness, the open account contract is discharged and a new contract is created
between the same parties. If the debtor then defaults on the note, the creditor
may successfully sue on the note but not on the open account. The "patronage contract" frequently is, among other things, a contract to enter into a
contract, the latter contract being the "investment contract." See note 91 infra.
44. Colony Farms Cooperative Dairy, Inc., 17 T. C. 688 (1951) ; Otsego
County Cooperative Association, Inc., P-H 1952 TC Mem. Dec. 1 52,q46
(1952).
45. 9 T. C. 1077 (1947), aff'd, 172 F. 2d 666 (7th Cir. 1949). In the
Fountain City case, the Tax Court observed that the cooperative "has never
limited the amount of dividends which it may pay to its stockholders and has
therefore never made any provision for any enforceable distribution to its
patrons." (p. 1080) There having been no obligation (when the cooperative
received the funds in question) to pay them to the patrons, those funds became income to the cooperative as and when it received them. The subsequent
voluntary payments to the patrons could not have transformed those funds
into non-income receipts even though the payments to the patrons had been
made in actual cash. Consequently, the above quoted finding should have
ended the case with the same result as finally reached by the court, i.e., the
funds in question were income to the cooperative. However, the Fountain City
net margins were paid by issuing patrons equity reserve credits. That circumstance led the court into an unnecessary and impossible attempt to distinguish
the United Cooperatives case on the basis of differences between United's preferred stock and Fountain City's patrons equity reserve credits. Actually, all
of those differences were immaterial; the essential distinction being that
United was obligated to pay its patrons, but Fountain City was not.
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credits.4 Colony Farms was obligated to pay those of its patrons
who also were members all of the net margins which resulted from
their patronage, but the member-patrons had consented to the cooperative's retention of that money in a revolving capital fund.
The cooperative allocated those net margins to those patrons, invested them in that fund, and issued to those patrons its "Certificates of Interest." The Tax Court held that the cooperative was
47
entitled to exclude those net margins from its gross income.
Thus the Tax Court, in the cooperatives' tax cases, has reached
sound and consistent results by analyzing the "patronage contract"
provisions to ascertain whether or not the cooperative is obligated
to pay the net margins to its patrons and if so, by recognizing that
the net margins are paid and that contract is performed when the
cooperative issues either stock or non-stock credits.
In the patrons' tax cases, there has been no equivalent analysis
of the "patronage contract," and the result has been the confusion
previously noted. 48 The confusion in such cases can be avoided. If
the cooperative is obligated to make the payment, then the substance and legal effect of the transaction is that the patron receives
his share of the net margins in cash, and he should include that
amount in his gross income without regard to the disposition he
makes of that income. It should be immaterial whether he reinvest
that income in the cooperative or in any other venture or in none at
46. ".... [Iln Fountain City. . . , the amount of the dividends on its
stock was not subject to limitation. Its directors might, in their discretion
allocate all of the earnings from member business as dividends upon the
stock, and consequently pay no patronage dividends. In view of this condition,
the power thus held by the taxpayer's directors, we held that any action on
their part in making a distribufton of such earnings to the members was
purely discretionary and voluntary and not taken under a legal obligation to
sov act. The cited case has no application here where . . . the directors are
definitely obligated by its by-laws. . . . The absence of this condition in
Fountain City Cooperative Creamery Ass'n, supra, was the reason for the
conclusion reached by us in that case." Colony Farms Cooperative Dairy, Inc.,
17 T. C. 688, 694 (1951).
47. Id. at 693-694: "...
the funds represented by these certificates of
interest are retained by the cooperative with the consent of its members and
represent an investment by each of them in the business to the same extent
as if the distribution had been made in cash and the amount in each instance
had been repaid by the member to the association for its use as working
capital.
"That the distributions in the form of certificates of interest affected a
distribution of the earnings just as effectively as though made in the form
of cash, it is thought, cannot be disputed."
48. See note 8 supra. Since this article was written, the Government
filed its brief in Commissioner v. B. A. Carpenter, on appeal in the Fifth
Circuit. For the first time in a patron's tax case, the Government clearly
spelled out the legal basis and authorities for excluding the patron's net
margins from a cooperative's gross income. Unfortunately, however, there
is no explanation of the fundamental economic factors which properly require that the patronage contract be construed as making the net margins
the property of the patron rather than of the cooperative.
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all. That being so, the market value of the investment in which he
reinvests that cash income should be immaterial. It should be
equally immaterial whether the patron is on a cash or accrued basis.
If, on the other hand, the cooperative's payment is voluntary,
the measure of the income which the patron realizes should depend
upon whether the payment is made in (1) cash without the privilege of reinvesting it in the cooperative, or (2) cash with the
privilege of reinvesting it in the cooperative, or (3) securities of
the cooperative or a third person in which the cooperative invested
its cash. In either of the first two kinds of payment, the patron
actually receives cash and realizes income to the extent of the cash
which he receives and, in the second situation, without regard to
the market value of the securities in which he reinvests his cash.
If, however, such voluntary payment is made only in credits or
securities, then they are all that the patron receives and the fair
market value of them when received is the proper measure of the
income which he then realizes.
VII. PATRoN's TAX CASES-IN THE

TREASURY

The confusion which now confounds a lawyer attempting to
advise his farmer clients with respect to reporting their net margins
and if so, at what valuation, is traceable to the Bureau of Internal
Revenue in the first instance. In I.T. 3280, 1938-2 C.B. 127, the
Treasury indicated that amounts which a cooperative credits on its
books to its patrons are taxable to them without regard to whether
or not any certificate is issued. In 1943, the Bureau took the position
that if patronage refunds of a marketing cooperative are paid "in"
capital stock or certificates of indebtedness, they constitute income
to the recipient "to the extent of the cash value of the refunds
[and] this is true whether or not the [stock or certificates] have a
realizable fair market value. . .. 14'The Treasury subsequently
49. Letter, dated November 23, 1943, from Deputy Commissioner of

Internal Revenue to National Council of Farmer Cooperatives, quoted in
John H. Davis, An Economic Analysis of the Tax Status of Farmer Cooperatives 85-87 (Am. Inst. Coop., Wash., D. C., 1950). That ruling was
interpreted to mean that "patronage refunds are taxable to the recipient (in)
the year paid, regardless of the form in which distributed. The reasoning of
the Bureau seems to be that since patronage refunds are not taxable to the
cooperative they should logically be taxable to the patron recipient in the year
in which they were deemed to have been constructively paid and reinvested."
Id. at 87. It should be noted that that view erroneously assumes that all
patronage refunds paid by a cooperative may be excluded from its gross
income. Actually, only payments made in performance of an obligation to the
patrons are excludable by the cooperative. Hence, it is necessary to determine
that the cooperative's payment was obligatory, and not voluntary, in order to
bring it within the reason for the Treasury's ruling that patrons should include
in their returns the face value of the security regardless of its market value.
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reiterated that rule at various times. 50 In each case, the Treasury
measured the income to the patron by the full par or face value of
the stock or non-stock credits issued to the patron, and without
regard to whether the cooperative's payment was obligatory or
voluntary, whether or not the patron had agreed to accept such
stock or credits in lieu of cash, or what the market value of the
same may have been. The Treasury apparently was trying to
establish a rule which would both be simple in its application and
require the maximum amount of tax from the patrons.
After passage of § 314(a) of the Revenue Act of 195151 amended Int. Rev. Code, § 101 (12).2 relative to the taxation of "exempt"
53
cooperatives, the Treasury in 1953 amended Regulations 111.
The new regulations, for the first time, included provisions relative
to "Tax Treatment as to Parons."' 5 4 In 1954, the Treasury supplemented the new regulations with Rev. Rul. 54-10.' Thus, Reg.
118, § 39.33(a)-23 and Rev. Rul. 54-10 set forth the current
position of the Treasury.
It is significant that the Treasury now recognizes the necessity
for determining whether the cooperative's payment was obligatory
or voluntary. Where the cooperative's payment "is in the form of
capital stock, revolving fund certificates, certificates of indebtedness,
letters of advice, retain certificates or similar documents" then the
measure of the income to the patron is "the face amount of such
documents, if the allocation was made in fulfillment and satisfaction of a valid obligation of such association to the patron, which
obligation was in existence prior to the receipt by the cooperative
association of the amount allocated." (Italics added.) 56 That meas50. ". . . [I]t is held to be immaterial whether refunds are distributed
in the form of cash, stock, certifimtes of indebtedness, or credit notices. All
such forms of payment are regarded as the equivalent of cash distributions in
the hands of the patrons, the theory being that they are cash payments
automatically reinvested under the provisions of the charter, by-laws, or
other contracts previously agreed to by the patrons." Bur. Int. Rev. Press
Release, No. S-520, 19, Oct. 31, 1947.
"Patronage dividends are considered paid to you when remitted in cash,
merchandise, stock certificates, or when credited to your account." Bur. Int.
Rev., How to Prepare Your U. .1. Income Tax Return 10 (1949).
"Distributions by cooperatives in the form of capital stock, or in any
form other than cash, should be included in the gross income of the patrons
to the same extent that such distributions would be included if paid in cash."
Bur. Int Rev., Income Tax Information Release No. 2, April 13, 1950.
51. Revenue Act of 1951, § 314(a), 65 Stat. 491 (1951).
52. Now Int Rev. Code of 1954, 99 521-522.
53. T. D. 6014, approved May 29, 1953, 1953-1 Cum. Bull. 110.
54. Reg. 111, § 29.22(a)-23; now Reg. 118 § 39.22(a)-23.
55. 1954 Int Rev. Bull. No. 2 (1954).
56. Reg. 118, § 29.22(a)-23(b) (iii) (A). Cf. Rev. Rul. 54-10, §§ 3.01,

3.02, 3.04.
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ure of income in cases of obligatory payments rests on sound
analysis.
Where the cooperative's payments to its patrons are in the noncash document forms above enumerated but are voluntary rather
than in performance of a valid obligation, "such documents shall
be includable in the income of the patron to the extent of their fair
market value at the time of their receipt" but only if the documents are "negotiable instruments.15 7 If the documents are not

negotiable, then they need not be taken into the patron's gross
income when received, but the investor must report income "to the
extent of the cash or merchandise received in redemption of such
[non-negotiable] instruments ... at the time of the receipt of such
cash or merchandise by the patron."58 Again, it is necessary to
examine the "patronage contract" in order to determine whether
the cooperative's payment is voluntary. If it is voluntary but if,
in addition, the patron is offered a choice of cash or documents,
then the substance and effect of the transaction is a cash payment
by the cooperative and a reinvestment by the patron so that the
measure of income to the patron properly should be the face value
of the documents, the same as in cases of obligatory payments
made "in" document form. Where the payment is voluntary and the
patron is offered only the documents, the measure of the patron's
income properly should be the "fair market value [of the documents] at the time of receipt"-but without regard to whether the
documents are negotiable or non-negotiable.5 9
57. Reg. 118, § 29.22(a)-23(b) (iii) (C). Cf. Rev. Rul. 54-10, § 3.03.
58. Ibid.
59. The Treasury's attempt to differentiate between negotiable and nonnegotiable documents voluntarily issued to the patrons appears to be an
unnecessary and unjustified complication. If, under the "patronage contract,"
the cooperative was not obligated to pay the net margins to its patrons and
therefore its issuance of a document is voluntary, then the patron receives
something which he previously did not have and to which he previously was

not entitled. Under such circumstances, the cooperative's voluntary issuance
and tender of the document to the patrons is an offer by the cooperative to
enter into a new "investment contract." If the patron accepts that offer by
accepting and retaining the document, a new "investment contract" is then

and thereby entered into and a new relationship of cooperative and investor
is then and thereby created. If that new "investment contract" (whether
it be stock, promissory note, revolving fund credit, or any other kind of a
contract) has any market value at all, the contract then (at the time of
receipt) is property of some value and the patron derived it from his

patronage of the cooperative. It therefore constitutes "gross income derived
from business," Int. Rev. Code 1954, § 61(a) (2), and should be included
in the patron's return at the fair market value of his investment interestwithout regard to whether the certificate is negotiable or non-negotiable.
Negotiability frequently is one element of value. But it certainly is not
a valid exclusive test of whether or not a document possesses any value. The
requirement that investors report as ordinary income the proceeds received on
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By its recent regulations and ruling,60 the Treasury has now
indicated its awareness that its earlier rule6' of taxing patrons on
the full face value of any and all non-cash patronage refunds was
too simple. That measure of income to the patron is sound where
the cooperative's payment is obligatory under the "patronage contract." However, the cooperative's voluntary offer of an "investment contract" is income to the patron who accepts it, but only to
the extent of the fair market value of such investment interest
when the patron receives it. It is to be hoped that the Treasury will
recognize that a cooperative's voluntary alternative offer of cash
or securities having a like face value and the patron's acceptance
of the securities is, in substance, a payment in cash and a reinvestment of the cash in the securities; in such a case, the measure of
the patron's income is the amount of cash or face value of the documents without regard to their market value. Finally, it is to be
hoped that the Treasury's arbitrary distinction between negotiable
and non-negotiable documents and its attempted avoidance of the
statute of limitations62 will riot prevail. Subject to those qualifications, sound principles underlie the Treasury's recognition that
"face" value is the proper measure of income to the patron in some
cases while "market" value is the proper measure in other cases
and the implication that, in every patron's tax case, the terms of
the "patronage contract" must first be examined to determine
the retirement of non-negotiable securities appears to be arbitrary. Revenue
agents, farmers, the Treasury, cooperatives, judges, lawyers, and accountants alike were, for many years, more than a little uncertain concerning the
circumstances under which a cocperative could exclude its net margins from
its gross income or a farmer should include his share of those net margins
in his gross income, and at what value when paid "in" something other than
cash. During those years, many farmers undoubtedly resolved that uncertainty in the same way that other taxpayers resolve ambiguities concerning their tax liability-by adopting whatever alternative will result in less
tax. Undoubtedly, many non-cash patronage refunds were omitted from the
recipients' returns in those years. However, the Treasury's tardiness in
discerning or enforcing the law applicable to patrons' liability for tax on
non-cash patronage refunds is no justification for ignoring sound principles
and initiating an arbitrary regulation to accomplish a retroactive effect.
A further "grab" for revenue at the expense of sound principle is the
Treasury's recently devised "poicy" that "when a patron receives [a noncash patronage refund] and reports less than the face amount of the . ..
document, his basis [upon redemption, sale or other dispostion of the document] will be limited to the amount reported in income in the year of receipt
thereof and the excess of the anount reported will represent gross hinconle
to the patron in the year of such redemption, sale or other disposition." Rev.
Rul. 54-10, 4. It may well be questioned whether the Treasury possesses the
power thus to effect a repeal cr exception to the Congressionally enacted
statutes of limitation.
60. See notes 54 and 55 mtra.
61. See note 50 supra.
62. See note 59 supra.
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whether the cooperative's payment by issuing an "investment contract" was obligatory or voluntary.
VIII.

PATRONS' TAX CASES-IN TE TAx COURT

A series of patrons' tax cases in the Tax Court constitutes an
interesting deevlopment, the end of which is not yet in sight. In
HarborPlywood Corporation,63 the first such case, the court held
that certain "credit memoranda" issued by a manufacturers' cooperative were income to its accrual basis patron when issued rather
84
than when redeemed. The court noted the "well settled" rule
that cooperatives may exclude from their income net margins paid
pursuant to a contractual obligation. But the court gave no indication of any analysis of the "patronage contract" to determine
whether the cooperative's payment was obligatory or voluntary,
and apparently no question was raised concerning the market value
of the credit memoranda. The real subject of consideration was
the distinction for an accrual basis taxpayer between a contingency
as to his right to receive income and an uncertainty as to the time
of receipt. The court assumed that the cooperative could exclude
its payments and that if the cooperative may exclude that income,
the patron necessarily must include it.
A week later, in George Bradshaw v. Commissioner, 5 the Tax
Court held that accrual basis patrons of a dealers' wholesale grocery
cooperative were required to include in their income, when received and at full face value, certain subordinated, registered notes
of the cooperative which were not payable until liquidation although redeemable upon call by the cooperative's board. Again,
there was no real analysis of the "patronage contract" or of the
theory underlying cooperatives' payments of net margins "in" noncash investment securities. Rather, the court again decided the
case on the ground that,
"There was an uncertainty as to the time when the
(patron) would receive the cash, but no contingency as to its
63. 14 T. C. 158 (1950), aff'd, 187 F. 2d 734 (2d Cir. 1951).
64. "It is now well settled, however, that cooperative associations ...
are not taxable on the income which, pursuant to their articles of incorporation or by-laws or contracts, they are required to return to the stockholders
each year as patronage dividends or rebates. (cases cited) This is true
whether the amounts are actually paid to the members in cash during the
taxable year or merely credited to them on the books of the association. (case
cited) The reason for this rule is that the patronage dividends or rebates
are at all times the property of the member stockholders, and nonmembers,
and that the selling association is an agent, a trustee or mere conduit for the
income.' Id. at 161.
65. 14 T. C. 162 (1950).
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right to receive it or as tc the amount, such as would have prevented its accrual."
The court added,
"Neither is there any evidence on which we could determine a fair market value of anything less than their face value."
Thus, the first two patrons' tax cases to come before the Tax
Court involved patrons who were a building materials manufacturer and retail grocery dealers on an accrual basis. Probably as a
result of those circumstances, neither any proper analysis of a
cooperative-patron "patronage contract," nor the mandatory obligation and reinvestment theories, nor the series of agricultural
cooperative cases in which those sound theories were hammered
out over a period of years was presented to the court. Under that
analysis of a "patronage contract," it is immaterial whether the
patron is on a cash basis or an accrual basis and the market value of
the securities involved likewise is immaterial. Without having that
analysis adequately reviewed, the court was led off into considering
the difference between a contingent right to income and uncertainty as to the time of receipt,-a matter of importance in cases
involving accrual basis taxpayers and other kinds of contracts, but
of no consequence under a proper analysis of the "patronage contract" between a cooperative and its patrons.
P. Phillips v. Commissionere6 was the first cash basis patron
of an agricultural cooperative to come before the Tax Court. Hav67
ing analyzed the "patronage contract" in the cooperative's case,
66. 17 T. C. 1027 (1951).
67. Dr. P. Phillips Cooperative, 17 T. C. 1002 (1951). That cooperative (1) cared for groves and (2) marketed. It paid part of the net margins
to its patrons in cash, but it retained all net margins from caretaking and part
of the net margins from marketing. The sums retained were placed in re-

serves against which the cooperative issued revolving fund certificates to its

patrons. Some of the fruit marketed by it had been purchased by its patrons
from other growers. With respect to that fruit, the patrons were dealers
rather than growers. Consequertly, the association did not qualify as an
association of farmers or fruit growers, and its claim of exemption under
Int. Rev. Code, § 101(12) was denied. It thus became necessary to determine whether the cooperative, as a non-exempt association, was entitled to
exclude the net margins from i-s gross income. The court found that the
association was not obligated to pay to its patrons the proceeds of its
marketing activities and properly concluded that, "[s]ince the patrons had
no right to those retained amounts and have not received them, they could
not be regarded as having contributed them to the petitioner." Id. at 1010.
However, "the caretaking contracts contained a provision requiring the
issuance of revolving fund certificates for any excessive receipts over expenses retained by the petitioner.... It issued revolving fund certificates
for those amounts and they may be excluded from income." Id. at 1011. The
significance of the case is that the court analyzed the "patronage contract"
and because there was an obligation to distribute the net margins from caretaking, the cooperative was entitled to exclude them from income; but
because there was no obligation to distribute the net margins from marketing,
the cooperative was not entitled to exclude them from its income.
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and having incorporated the findings in that case in the patron's
case, 68 Judge Murdock properly observed that:
"The Cooperative was under no obligation either to return
the amounts to the members or to issue revolving fund certificates for the amounts it retained as a reserve from marketing
operations. They belonged to and were taxable income of the
Cooperative.... Dr. P. Phillips Cooperative voluntarily issued
revolving fund certificates against the amounts retained from
marketing operations. Those certificates had no fair market
value and did not represent income to the petitioners on that
basis....
"The situation with respect to the amounts retained by the
Cooperative from its 1946 caretaking activities is different. It
has been held in Dr. P. Phillips Cooperative, supra, that those
amounts never belonged to the Cooperative. It was required
by its contracts with its members to issue revolving fund certificates for the funds thus retained. The members agreed in
advance that those funds, which continued to belong to them,
could be retained by the Cooperative for the special purpose
of the reserve."' 9
In the cooperative's case, the court had analyzed the "patronage
contracts" and determined that one kind of payment was obligatory and, therefore, excludable by the cooperative but that the
other kind of payment was voluntary and, therefore, not excludable. Significantly, the court in the patron's case then recognized that the "patronage contracts" apply to both parties. Consequently, the patron was entitled to the obligatory payment and had
received and reinvested it in the revolving fund and thereby became liable for tax on the face amount of it notwithstanding the
fact that, "[t]he certificates had no fair market value at the times
they were issued."'7 The patron was not entitled to receive the
voluntary payment and, therefore, was required to take into income
only the market value which was nothing. The case is an example
of proper application of the two different measures of income which
apply to the two different kinds of payment.
Regrettably, however, different counsel for the Treasury, at
almost the same time, presented another patron's case independently of the cooperative's case, in complete disregard of any analysis
of the "patronage contract," and with a consequent lack of awareness that different measures of income should apply to different
kinds of payments, and on a theory which precluded any measure
of income other than the fair market value of the "investment con68. P. Phillips, 17 T. C. 1027, 1029 (1951).
69. Ibid.
70. Id. at 1028.

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 39:135

tract." In Estate of Wallace Caswell v. Commissioner 7 ' the Commissioner did not rely on any theory of actual or constructive receipt and reinvestment of money, but contended, first, that the
patrons, in payment for their peaches, had received other property
(certificates) in addition to cash and, under § 111(b) ,72 thereby
realized income to the extent of the fair market value of the certificates at the time of issue and, second, that the fair market value of
the certificates was equal to face value.
As a consequence of that presentation, the Tax Court made no
analysis of the "patronage contract," made no determination of
whether the cooperative's payment was obligatory or voluntary,
and did not consider whether the "investment contract" evidenced
by the certificate was anything different from the "patronage contract." It appeared to the Tax Court that the patron had received
something-at least a certificate-that he did not previously have.
The court determined that the certificate had some value and, in
the absence of evidence to the contrary, concluded that the market
value was equal to the face value. Thus, without any consideration
of principles applicable to patronage refunds paid pursuant to a
contractual obligation of the cooperative, the market value measure
was applied without even any suggestion that while that measure
of income might properly apply to voluntary payments, it can have
no proper application to an obligatory payment which the recipient
received and reinvested in some kind of an "investment contract."73
Under § 111 (b), fair market: value was the only possible measure
of income.
In William A. Joplin v. Commissioner,7 4 the Commissioner re71. 17 T. C. 1190 (1952), rv'd, 211 F. 2d 693 (9th Cir. 1954).
72. Int. Rev. Code, § 111 (b) : "The amount realized from the sale or
other disposition of property sh..ll be the sum of any money received plus
the fair market value of the property (other than money) received."
73. In the Caswell case, the court recognized that, "In Dr. P. Phillips
Cooperative, 17 T. C. 1002... we declined to extend the conduit theory...
where it was not shown that the certificates issued against the reserves were
issued 'pursuant to a pre-existing obligation or liability'." However, the
court failed to analyze the Caswell "patronage contract" and determine
whether the cooperative's payment was obligatory or voluntary. Consequently,
the court failed to recognize that if the payments were obligatory, then they
had been received and reinvested by the patron and should have been
taxed to the patron at their face value without regard to their market
value. The court cited P. Phillips to bolster its conclusion that the market
value was equal to the face value, but again without any analysis of the
"patronage contract" and with no determination of whether the payments
were obligatory and reinvested or voluntary. It is unfortunate that the
government rested its case on Int. Rev. Code § 111 (b) instead of on a proper
analysis of the "patronage contract" and the obligatory or voluntary nature
of the payments as was done in P. Phillips.
74. 17 T. C. 1526 (1952).
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lied on both cooperatives' tax cases75 and patrons' cases76 and not
at all on § 111(b). There was an opportunity for the court to get
back to the correct analysis displayed in P. Phillips. However,
after briefs had been filed, the Tax Court decided Caswell and too
quickly asserted that "the Caswell case is controlling here." United
and Colony Farms were too summarily dismissed on the ground
' 77
that they "involved non-exempt cooperatives and not the patrons.
HarborPlywood and Bradshaw went out the window because they
involved accrual basis patrons of non-exempt cooperatives.78 But
the Caswell case, which had been submitted on the radically different theory of § 111(b) was considered "controlling." It is regrettable that the court decided Joplin on the authority of Caswell
without even any opportunity for counsel to argue or brief the
question of whether Caswell could properly apply to the facts and
theory of Joplin. It is even more regrettable that the court, in
Joplin, did not even refer to P. Phillips where the court held that
obligatory payments reinvested by the patron were income to the
patron at face value and that voluntary payments in non-cash forms
were income to the patron at market value.
If the cooperatives' payments in Caswell and Joplin were voluntary, the results of those cases which measured the patron's income
by the market value of the investment he received could be sound.
However, even if the results in those cases were correct, the theory
was wrong.
75. United Cooperatives, Inc., 4 T. C. 93 (1944) ; Colony Farms Co-

operative Dairy, Inc., 17 T. C. 688 (1951).
76. Harbor Plywood, 14 T. C. 158 (1950), aff'd, 187 F. 2d 734 (2d Cir.
1951); George Bradshaw, 14 T. C. 162 (1950).
77. It is a distinction without a difference to say that United and

Colony Farms involved "cooperatives and not the patrons." Like Joplin,

those cases involved the nature of a "patronage contract' and the question
of which party to it realized the income which resulted from it. In all three
cases the issue involved the proper interpretation of that contract That
affects both parties to the contract.
78. The fact that the cooperatives in United, Colony, Harbor and
Bradshaw were "non-exempt" while the cooperatives involved in Joplin
and Ca.swell happened to be "exempt" is also a distinction without a difference. A non-exempt cooperative may exclude the net margins from its gross
income only to the extent that it is obligated to distribute them to its patrons,
and a cooperative cannot qualify for "exemption" unless it must distribute
the net margins (in excess of limited dividends on stock) to its patrons on a
patronage basis. Fertile Coop. Dairy Ass'n v. Huston, 119 F. 2d 274 (8th
Cir. 1941). In either case, if the "patronage contract' obligates the association to distribute, it necessarily entitles the patron to receive. Consequently,
the "patronage contract' should be examined in all patron's tax cases regardless of whether the cooperative is exempt or non-exempt
Finally, if the "patronage contract' 'is properly analyzed, and if it is
found that, under the "patronage contract," the cooperative is obligated to
distribute the net margins and the patron is obligated to reinvest his share
of the net margins in some kind of an "investment contract," then it is
immaterial whether the patron is on a cash or an accrual basis.
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Only correct theory can, in the long run, produce consistently
correct results. That was demonstrated in B. A. Carpenter v.
Commissionere9 where the Commissioner correctly argued that
the cooperative was obligated to distribute patronage refunds, that
the patron had agreed to accept them either in cash or in revolving
fund credits, and that when such refunds were paid "in" revolving
fund credits, the patron realized cash income which he reinvested
in the revolving fund and, therefore, "that the revolving fund certificates should be taxable at their face amount regardless of
whether or not they had any fair market value at the time of their
issuance." However, the Commissioner complicated that sound
argument by adding that, "cooperatives have been permitted to
exclude the full amount of such allocated profits from income under
conditions such as exist in this case" and he continued, "as a corollary, that he has included in the taxable income of the member the
full amount of allocated profits evidenced by certificates in the same
year the exclusion is allowed," and he concluded that, "consistency
and protection of the revenue support the Bureau contention that
such proceeds are properly taxable at full face value."80 Being unpersuaded by the Commissioner's "consistency" argument, the
court too summarily brushed aside United and Colony Farnms.xl
The Commissioner argued for consistency of results. What is
needed is consistency of analysis and principles.
If the Tax Court had studied the cooperatives' tax cases instead
of brushing them aside, it could have learned why cooperatives are
entitled to exclude patronage refunds under what circumstances.' 2
However, the court superficially reviewed Caswell, Joplin and P.
Phillips, and then concluded that, "the patronage dividends are to
be taxed or not taxed depending on whether or not they have a
fair market value." Then without analyzing the "patronage contract" before it, the court stated that the patron "never had any
real dominion or control over the funds represented by the certificates," and that "we do not see whether or not the cooperative was
obligated to issue such certificates adds anything significant." The
certificates having no market value, the court decided that the
79. 20 T. C. 603 (1953). This case is being appealed to the Circuit Court
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.
80. Id. at 606.
81. "Little would be gained. by discussing the cases involving exclusion
of patronage dividends by cooperatives. Whatever may be the virtues of consistency, it cannot always be attained. The cooperative and its patrons are

different entities and we do not think it necessarily follows that what is
excludable from the income of the cooperative, whether the cooperative be
taxable or tax exempt, automatically becomes income to the member."

Id. at 607.
82. See discussion in parts IV and VI supra.
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patron owed no tax on them. It is understandable that the court
saw nothing significant in an obligation to issue "certificates," 83 but
it is to be hoped that upon review of the cooperatives' tax cases and
a proper presentation of its own conduit and reinvestment theories,
the court would have seen a decisive significance in an obligation
to pay over the net margins to the patrons, with or without any
certificates.
In Mary Grace Howey v. Commissioner,8 ' the Tax Court followed Carpenterand held that the recipient of certain "retain certificates" was taxable only on the fair market value of the certificates. Again, the court found that the association was not obligated
to issue the "certificates" and again failed to analyze the "patronage
contract" to determine whether the cooperative was obligated to pay
the net margins to its patrons.
However wrong it may be in a case of obligatory payments reinvested by a patron, the Tax Court is now on record that market
value is the measure of income to the patrons. That is in conflict
with the Treasury's position that face value is the measure where
the payment is made "in" document form pursuant to an obligation
to pay out the net margins. That conflict is yet to be resolved. It is
hoped that when it is resolved, it will be done with more discriminating analysis than either the Tax Court or the Treasury has shown
in the foregoing cases. There is still hope for the ultimate triumph
of sound analysis and principles in the fact that the Tax Court has
not yet held that a patron's income from patronage payments "in"
non-cash form are not taxable at face value, instead of market
value, where such payments are made pursuant to a contractual
obligation of the cooperative and reinvested by the patron. In the
reviewed cases, other than P. Phillips,the court did not realize or
recognize any reinvestment. The difficulties in the cases decided to
date are (1) the court's emphasis on the issuance of "certificates"
instead of the "investment contracts" which the certificates merely
evidence, (2) the court's tendency to examine the terms of the
"certificate" issued instead of the "patronage contract" to determine the reciprocal rights and obligations of the cooperative and
its patrons with reference to the payment of net margins, and (3)
the court's failure to explain how the cooperatives in the reviewed
83. A certificate is only evidence of that which it certifies. Just as the
issuance of a stock certificate is not essential to the issuance of a share of stock,
so it should not be necessary to issue a certificate in order to issue a revolving
fund credit. It is the issuance of the stock or credit which discharge both

the cooperative's obligation to pay the net margins and the patron's obligation to invest in the capital stock or revolving fund.
84. P-H 1954 TC Mem. Dec. f154,125 (1954).
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cases could lawfully have diverted the funds in question from its
patrons as such to its stockholders or members as such. Consequently, the way is still open for the Tax Court to review its analysis of
the "patronage contracts" involved in the cooperatives' tax cases
and to apply that sound analysis to similar contracts in future
patrons' cases. s5

IX.

PATRONS' TAX CASES

-

IN THE COURTS OF APPEAL

Of the seven patrons' tax cases decided by the Tax Court,8
only Estate of Wallace Caswell v. Commissioner87 and HarborPlywood Corporatio 8s have been reviewed by a court of appeals as this
is being written. 9 The single sentence opinion of the Court of
Appeals in HarborPlywood demonstrates that it was led off on the
same tangent as was the Tax Court. As previously noted,10 Caswell was presented by the Treasury exclusively under Int. Rev.
Code § 111(b) and independently of any analysis of the "patronage contract." The Court of Appeals did review the association's
by-laws and crop contracts and, with no indication of the nature
of its analysis or reasoning, simply announced its conclusion:
"The certificates . . . were mere evidences of their [the

patrons'] contingent rights in and to the commercial reserve
fund mentioned above-rights which existed prior to 1945 under and by virtue of the Association's by-laws and the crop
contracts mentioned above. The certificates did not give [the
patrons] any new right or any greater right than they had before the certificates were issued." 91
One cannot dispute the court's observation that the "certificates"
were "mere evidences" only of their rights as investors under their
85. While all of the cases to date involved tax years prior to the enactment of the Revenue Act of 1951, it is strange that neither the Treasury nor
the Tax Court has taken cognizance of the Congressional intention demonstrated in the Senate debate on that bill:
"Mr. Kerr. And this then means that patronage refunds or rebates, allocated to patrons pursuant to a pre-existing contract between patrons and the
cooperative, should not be deemed to be income to the cooperative or be
included in computing its net or gross income as has been true for many
years past?
"Mr. George. That is a correct interpretation of the language of the bill.
There is no intention whatever to treat funds allocated to patrons in any
new or different way but to continue to treat them as in the past.
"Mr. Kerr. Mr. President, I thank the distinguished chairman of the
committee." 97 Cong. Rec. 11960 (1951).
86. See part VIII supra.
87. 17 T. C. 1190 (1952), rev'd, 211 F. 2d 693 (9th Cir. 1954).
88. 14 T. C. 158 (1950), aff'd, 187 F. 2d 734 (2d Cir. 1951).
89. P. Phillips, 17 T. C. 1027 (1951), and B. A. Carpenter, 20 T. C.
603 (1953), have been appealed.
90. See discussion at note 71 supra, et seq.
91. Caswel's Estate v. CIR, 211 F. 2d 693, 696 (9th Cir. 1954).

ASPECTS OF COOPERATIVES' BY-LAWS

"investment contracts" and not of their rights as patrons under
their "patronage contract." As patrons they had no "rights in the
contingent reserve fund," contingent or vested. As patrons they had
a right and an obligation to invest their net margins in the fund
and thereby, at that time, acquire an interest in the fund as investors. 2 The fact that the statute, articles, by-laws and crop contract constitute more than one kind of a contract, and the further
fact that the taxpayers stand in a different legal relationship to their
cooperative as patrons than they do as investors holding a credit in
the commercial reserve fund, and the final fact that the "patronage
contract" was discharged and the "investment contract" created
by the distribution of the net margins were totally overlooked.
\Vhile the result of the case may or may not be correct insofar as
the patron was relieved from the payment of tax,93 the theory of
the case is wrong. It is an excellent example of the need for a clearer understanding of the multiple contract nature of a cooperative's
by-laws.
As it stands it may be anticipated that the Court of Appeals
opinion in the Cas-well case will be cited for a third view that the
patron has received no income under any measure of income9 4 in
92. In many cooperatives, the contributions to the revolving fund and
the credits issued against those contributions in each year are separately
identified by years, certificates to evidence those credits are issued in annual
series, subsequent losses are charged to the credits of designated years, and
the retirement of outstanding credits and the cancellation of outstanding
certificates as the fund revolves are related to the year of issuance. In other
cooperatives, the contributions, credits and certificates, subsequent charges for
losses, retirements and cancellations are all identified according to seasons or
some period of time other than a year, pools, commodities or departments
which produced the net margins which the patrons invested in the fund.
Where that is done, on either an annual or other basis, the revolving fund is
actually operated as several separate funds. If so, the fund for any particular
year or other period or pool would not even exist until the net margins
from that year, period or pool are invested in and thereby create such fund.
In such case, it would be manifestly inaccurate to construe the "patronage
contract" as having given the patron, at the time of his patronage, even a
"contingent right" in a fund which then was non-existent. At most, the
"patronage contract," at the time of patronage, gives the patron a right to
enter into an "investment contract" if and when he invests in the revolving
fund the proceeds of his share of the net margins. See note 43 supra.
93. Depending on whether, under a proper analysis of the "patronage
contract," the cooperative was obligated to pay and the patron to reinvest the
net margins which went into the reserve.
94. In an unreported oral opinion on June 30, 1954, in Moe v. Earle
(Civil No. 7074), the U. S. District Court for the District of Oregon cited
Caswell for its holding that the plaintiff-patrons realized no income "inthe
years in which such amounts were deducted from the sums of money payable
to the plaintiffs for their fruit, or in the year in which such (revolving fund)
certificates were issued to the plaintiffs," but that the cash which the plaintiffs
subsequently received upon redemption of those certificates was income to
them in the year of redemption. In arriving at that conclusion, the court was
"well aware of the fact that this finding does not agree with the contentions
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cases where the Tax Court would take the second view that market
value is the proper measure of income to the patron and where the
Treasury would insist upon the first view that face value is the
correct measure of the patron's income.
X.

CONCLUSIONS

The Treasury, the Tax Ccurt, and the Court of Appeals of the
Ninth Circuit have taken three different positions in the patrons'
income tax cases. Because some of the language in the "patronage
contracts" involved in some of those cases is similar to some
language of numerous other cooperatives' "patronage contracts,"
it may be anticipated that those patrons' tax cases will be cited as
authority for an erroneous construction of the latter contracts in
future cooperatives' tax cases. If so, the confusion and error recently generated in the patrons' cases may be transferred to the
cooperatives' cases. It also may be anticipated that the conflicting
views 'inthe patrons' tax cases may create similar confusion in
future litigation between cooperatives and patrons over the meaning
of their "patronage contracts."
That confusion can be avoided in the cooperatives' tax cases and
in the cooperative-patron cases in either of the two ways that it
still can be eliminated from the patrons' tax cases. One way is for
lawyers, both in and out of the Treasury, and judges to develop
an awareness of the multiple contracts and the multiple relationships involved in cooperatives' by-laws and related documents, and
then to differentiate the "patronage contract" between the cooperative and its patrons from both the "membership contract" between
of either the plaintiffs or the defendant in this case." The plaintiff-patrons
had contended that the statute of limitations commenced to run when they
received the certificates but omitted from their income tax return the net
margins which they then reinvested in the revolving fund and that the statute
had expired before the certificates were redeemed; the defendant-Collector
of Internal Revenue had contended that when a patron reports less than the
face amount of his certificate, his basis in the year of redemption will be the
amount reported when he received the certificate and the excess received on
redemption will be income in the year of redemption. See Rev. Rul. 54-10, 4
and note 59, supra. In Moe v. Ear!e, the court also relied on Farmers-Grain
Dealers Association of Iowa v. U. S., 116 F. Supp. 685 (S.D. Ia. 1953) in
which the plaintiff-patron was held not taxable on credits in a "Contingency
Reserve" established by another cooperative which plaintiff patronized. Although the opinion refers to the patron's inability to obtain cash for its
credits, examination of the coopera:ive's articles and by-laws and its directors'
resolution creating the reserves indicates that it was not obligated to pay to
its patrons the money which was transferred to the reserve so that its issuance
of credits must have been voluntary and there was nothing to indicate that
they had any market value. Thus, the result is sound, but the court in the
Moe case cited the Grain Dealers case for holding that the cooperative paid
nothing'on its "patronage contract" until it redeemed its "investment contract."
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the cooperative and its members or stockholders and the "investment contract" betveen the cooperative and the investors in its
revolving fund or other kinds of capital, and then to analyze properly the "patronage contract," not the "investment contract" evidenced by the certificates, and determine whether the "patronage
contract" obligates the cooperative to pay the net margins to its
patrons or whether such payments, regardless of form, are merely
voluntary.
Where the "patronage contract" precludes the cooperative from
ultimately diverting the net margins to its stockholders or members
as such, it would seem that it obligates the cooperative to pay them
to its patrons. 5 In such cases, the patron's authorization to the
cooperative to invest his net margins in capital stock or some other
kind of capital for him and to issue to him shares of stock or interests in the non-stock capital in performance of its obligation to
pay him his net margins is, in substance and effect, a reinvestment
95. United Cooperatives, Inc., 4 T. C. 93, 108 (1944) :
"We conclude that petitioner's patrons were entitled by reason of its
by-laws to that part of the so-called patronage dividends distributed to them
which was in excess of eight per cent of the par value of petitioner's common
stock outstanding, and to that extent these patronage dividends were properly
excluded from the taxable income of petitioner. However, that part of these
patronage dividends which could have been distributed in the discretion of
petitioner's board of directors as dividends upon petitioner's common stock
must be considered as the property of petitioner and taxable to it as its
income."
California Pine Box Distributing Company, P-H 1943 TC Mem. Dec. ff
43,365 (1943) :
"There was no means under the petitioner's articles of incorporation or
by-laws or its operating contract by which additions to reserves could ever
become its earnings. Petitioner had no right to accumulated earned surplus
and was not authorized to make any dividend distribution to its members."
Grey Bull Corp., 27 B. T. A. 853, 858 (1933) :
"The individuals were both shareholders in the petitioner as a corporation and contractors with it as an agent, bailee or agister. Before the corporation could find income to itself and thus indirectly to its shareholders, it
was obligated to fulfill its contractual duties."
Compare, Fountain City Cooperative Creamery Ass'n, 9 T. C. 1077,
1080 (1947):
Taxpayer "has never limited the amount of dividends which it may pay
to its stockholders and therefore has never made any provision for any enforceable distribution to its patrons."
In addition to limiting dividends on stock, cooperative by-laws also
frequently limit stockholders' rights on dissolution. Lawyers drafting by-laws
for cooperatives would do well to use plain English. They should avoid words
like "retain" which, to many people, connote a negation of an obligation to
pay and use enough words to spell out plainly (1) the cooperative's obligation to pay to the patrons in cash all or an ascertainable part of the net
margins, and (2) the patron's obligation to invest a like amount or some
different but ascertainable amount of cash in some definite or ascertainable
kind of equity or loan capital, and (3) the application of the elementary
principle of set-off to the complete or partial performance of those two
obligations. See note 29 supra.
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for and by the patron. His income from such a transaction should
be measured by the face value of his investment interest.
On the other hand, if the cooperative is free to pay the net
margins to its members or stockholders, but if it nevertheless does
pay them to its patrons in a non-cash "investment contract" which
the patron was not previously entitled to receive or obligated to
accept, then the cooperative's payment is voluntary. The measure
of the patron's income should be the narket value of his investment
interest without regard to the negotiable or non-negotiable character of the piece of paper issued as convenient evidence of that
interest.
In any event, it will be necessary to ascertain and analyze the
"patronage contract" in each case. Sound results will not consistently flow either (1) from a too simple rule that the patron's
income should be measured in all cases by the face value of the
"investment contract" he receives, or (2) from an equally too
simple rule that the patron's income must always be measured by
the market value of the "investment contract" issued to him, or
(3) from the misconception that he has an interest in a capital
fund before he invests anything in it.
If the confusion in the patrons' tax cases is not eliminated by
accurate analysis of contracts and application of sound principles,
it will be eliminated by legislation. It won't last forever. In the
meantime, lawyers will find it impossible to advise their patronclients reliably, and taxpayers will be put to the expense of litigating or negotiating settlements of disputes which never should
have arisen.

